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ABSTRACT 
This essay examines the Israeli market structure from the perspective of ownership. We 
distinguish between the several corporate holding-groups that dominate the 'Big EconomyJ 
and the multitude of smaller, largely independent, business entities of the 'Small 
EconomyJ. Although the two "sectors" operate under the same macroeconomic conditions, the 
analysis reveals marked differences in their business performance. These differences were 
reflected in an upward trend of aggregate concentration through the 1964-1986 period. Until 
the early 1970s the upward trend was moderate and was largely due to the different 
expansion paces of the two "sectors". Since then, however, the trend intensified as the 
'Small Economy' stagnated while profits in the 'Big EconomyJ continued to grow. 
RESUME 
Cet article examine la structure du marche israelien du point de vue de la propriete. I1 
fait la distinction entre les quelques groupes incorpores qui dominent la "grande economie" 
et la multitude d'unites d'affaires, pour la plupart independantes, de la "petite 
Cconomie". Quoique les d e w  "secteurs" fonctionnent dans les memes conditions 
macroeconomiques, notre analyse revele des differences marquees dans leur performance 
respective. Ces diffkrences se rCflktent dans une tendance vers la concentration globale 
durant la periode 1964-86. JusquJau dCbut des annees 1970, cette tendance etait moderee. 
Elle etait avant tout la consequence des rythmes differents d'expansion dans les deux 
"secteurs". Mais depuis, la tendance s'est intensifiee, la "petite Cconomie" restant 
stagnante, alors que les profits de la "grande economie" se developpent continuellement. 
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This essay examines the Israeli market structure from the perspective of ownership. The main 
focus is on the 'Big Economy' in general and on the corporate holding groups in particular. Part One 
provides an overview of the largest holding groups, outlines their history and discusses their modus 
operandi. It further considers the essential difference between the standard 'production' approach to 
structure and the 'ownership' perspective examined in this paper, arguing that the latter is a 
crucial element in understanding Israeli economic history. In Part Two we describe the data set and 
evaluate its appropriateness for our purpose. Part Three provides some empirical results and assesses 
their significance. Three related issues are explored here: (i) similarities and differences in the 
evolution of the largest holding groups, (ii) the performances of the 'Big Economy' in contrast with 
the 'Small Economy', and (iii) the development of several aggregate concentration measures. 
1. THE 'BIG ECONOMY' AND THE LARGEST HOLDING GROUPS 
1.1 Overview 
The largest form of business organization in Israel is the Conglomerate Holding Group, a highly 
diversified concern involved in most spheres of business activity. The 6 largest holding groups are 
Bank Leumi, Bank Hapoalim, Israel Discount Bankholding (IDBH), Koor Industries, the Israeli Govern- 
ment Group and Clal (Israel), the final one being a joint venture controlled by the first 5 groups. 
These groups increased in their significance mainly after 1967. All of them, however, were es- 
tablished prior to Independence in 1948 or had their roots in that period. Let us consider each one 
in turn. (There are additional holding groups and large firms operating in Israel. These, however, 
are not considered here because they are much smaller than the largest 6 groups and because data 
regarding these groups are inadequate.') 
Bank Leumi. The bank was originally established by the Jewish Agency in 1902 as Anglo-Palestine 
Co., for the purpose of land purchase in Palestine. In the Second World War, it changed direction and 
entered into international finance and business with industries supplying the British Army. With 
Independence in 1948, it became the monetary agent of the new Israeli Government. In 1950 it was 
renamed as Bank Leumi and gradually turned into a normal commercial bank While it is formally 
controlled by the Jewish Agency, in practice it is a "managerial corporation", having a board of 
directors that nominates itself. In terms of assets, Bank Leumi is one of Israel's two largest banks 
(together with Bank Hapoalim). It is concentrated mainly in financially related activities but also 
has direct investment in industry and services. 
Bank Ha~oalim. This was established in 1921 by Hevrat HaOvdim (which is the business arm of the 
Histadrut, the latter being Israel's largest--and by now only--trade union). Its initial purpose was 
to finance activities of organizations within Hevrat Haovdim but it rapidly ventured into the private 
These include corporations such as Solel Boneh, Teus, TAKAM (of the United Kibbutz Movement), 
Teva, Dubek, Elite, Delta, Dan Hotels and Shiff Hotels. Large foreign corporations are also 
involved in Israel. The most important are the Eisenberg Group, the Rothschild Group, Control 
Data Corporation (CDC), General Telephone and Equipment (GTE), Motorola, Hewlett Packard and 
TRW. 
sector, into business with government enterprises and into the international market. Presently, it is 
involved in finance, manufacturing and sentices through both its direct and indirect ownership in 
hundreds of firms. 
Israel Discount bank hold in^ (IDBH). The group was originally founded as a bank in 1936. By the 
early 1950s it grew to become Israel's largest privately-owned bank Currently, the Discount Bank 
itself is only one part of the IDBH holding group. This conglomerate expanded y& joint ventures and 
acquisitions into diverse areas such as real estate, shipping, oil refining and supply, provision of 
automotive parts, insurance, food, retail, agriculture, medical equipment and arms production and 
trade. 
Koor Industires. Koor was established in 1944 as a division of Sole1 Boneh (the country's 
largest construction corporation under the control of Hevrat HaOvdim). In 1958, Sole1 Boneh was 
reorganized and Koor Industries became an independent industrial corporation. After several difficult 
years, Koor began to expand rapidly, particularly into metal products, chemical products and electro- 
nics. Currently, it is Israel's largest industrial concern with direct control over hundreds of 
firms. 
The Israeli Government. The government in Israel is involved in many sectors of the market 
through direct investment in firms and its share in total industrial sales currently amounts to 
approximately 25%. It has a sign~ficant minority or majority interest in hundreds of companies, the 
most important of which are Israel Aircraft Industries (the country's largest industrial producer 
with 20,000 employees), Oil Refineries, Israel Chemicals (the largest mineral/chemical concern) and 
Israel Military Industries (the Israeli Defence Force weapon-production branch). 
Clal (Israel). The company was founded in 1962 by the Israeli Government together with Bank 
Leumi, IDBH, Bank Hapoalim, and several other local investors. The initial aim was to attract capital 
of South American Jewish investors by giving Clal (Israel) preferential government treatment. The 
company expanded rapidly through large acquisitions financed by the government on extremely favorable 
4 
terms2. While the aim of luring foreign capital has failed, the company's investments in production, 
services and finance became increasingly important for the local partners. By the early 1970s, the 
government "lost" its control over Clal (Israel) to the largest three partners, Bank Hapoalim, IDBH 
and Bank Leumi. Currently, this joint venture, or "Gravity Centre", is Israel's largest investment 
group with interests in over 150 firms. 
1.2 The Question of Modus Operandi 
Of the above 6 groups, only IDBH is under formal private control. Bank Hapoalim and Koor 
Industries are "workers" institutions, formally under the control of the Histadrut, itself a super- 
structure which incorporates a trade union and the business firms that the union controls. Bank Leumi 
is a "national" institution, formally controlled by the Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency used to be 
the unofficial government until Independence in 1948 and it continues to act as a "Zionist" organiza- 
tion. Finally, the Israeli Government group is a conglomerate of "crown" corporations. Since these 
latter groups are not under formal 'private' control their modus o~erandi deserves some closer 
attention. 
In what follows, we argue that (i) Bank Hapoalim, Koor Industries and Bank Leumi effectively 
operate as 'private' business organizations, seeking expansion of profits and accumulation of assets, 
and (ii) that the Israeli Government Group follows a more complex path: it often acts to facilitate 
the operations of the other groups rather than compete with them, while on other occasions it 
operates as a 'private' business organization for all intents and purposes. 
1.2.1 The "National" and "Worker" Organizations 
The perception of a separation between "national", "worker" and "private" economic organizations 
is inadequate for the present Israeli context. It reflects the image of the pre-independence period, 
This included privatization of government enterprises sold to Clal (Israel) at symbolic prices 
and subsidized government finance for other acquisitions. 
but this image of political and ideological demarcation was not a very close approximation of the 
underlying reality, even at that early period. In the British Mandate era of pre-independence, there 
was almost a complete symbiosis between political, economic and social organizations. Ben Gurion, for 
instance, sat on the board of Zim, a shipping line owned by Hevrat HaOvdim. He was an executive of 
Hevrat HaOvdim's management that in turn reported to the "Executive Committee of the Histadrut". He 
was also the Histadrut's General Secretary and the Secretary of Ahdut Ha'avodah (the "parent" 
political party of today's Labour Party). Ben Gurion also sat on the board of the Jewish Agency, the 
operational arm of the "Zionist Federation". Later, during the 1930s, Ben Gurion became the chairman 
of Jewish Agency which was, as already noted, the quasi-government on the way towards a Jewish 
autonomy in Palestine. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the word "Histadrut" meant everything associated with the "Workers' 
Sector". However, from the very beginning, the Histadrut constituted a superstructure for conflicting 
interests. On the one hand it acted as a trade union demanding exclusivity in the labour market 
while, on the other hand, it was (and still is) the biggest employer. The Histadrut fought against 
the discrimination of Arab workers, while it established a military arm, "Hahagana", that fought the 
Arabs. It supported the cooperatives (especially in agriculture) and workers' participation in 
profits, while it established industries that competed with the cooperatives and subsequently 
eliminated them. It organized strikes against low wages (in private factories) while its business 
organizations, like Koor, were unofficial (and later, official) members of the Industrialist Associa- 
tion that established anti-strike funds. 
Thus, the Histadrut was, already in the 1930s, a rather "loose" organization. It brought under 
one roof several large firms (united under Hevrat HaOvdim), a labour union which was rather hostile 
to those firms, and also the cooperative sector and the kibbutzim with their various ideological 
tendencies? 
The adhesive elements that united the members of the Histadrut were mainly its "enemies": (i) 
competing confederations like "Blue-White" of Jabotinsky, (ii) private employers, in particular 
citriculturists who were considered "capitalists" and "exploiters", (iii) the Arabs, and (iv) 
However, some firms in Hevrat HaOvdim demonstrated performance that gave them autonomy as early 
as the 1930s. Sole1 Boneh and Bank Hapoalim started to accumulate retained earnings in the Second 
World War. Tnuva and Hamashbir grew u? into large near-monopolies in the food and consumer-good 
areas, respectively. Koor Industries was separated from Sole1 Boneh in 1958. After 1967, Koor 
Industries established itself as the largest industrial conglomerate in Israel, employing about 20% 
of the industrial labour force in its hundreds of firms. Salaries of its management are often as much 
as 20 times higher than those of the workers in their factories. This perhaps explains why for the 
past couple of decades, many experts on the subject have viewed the Histadrut as a political-economic 
giant with an organizational power that oppresses workers rather than representing their interests 
despite the trade union element4 Also, there is very little dispute over the modus ooerandi of 
Hevrat HaOvdim as a business concern. The following citations are from Haim Barkai (1982), who uses 
Koor Industries as his representative example. 
"The most important characteristic of the producing factories ... relevant to our subject, 
is the fact that all workers are employees .... In other words, even though the ownership of 
the factory they work in is in the hands of the Histadrut's members, i.e., as members of 
the Histadrut they are theoretically among the owners of the factory they work in--the 
reality is actually different. Since this "ownership" is far from being tangible, the daily 
reality of workers in these factories is of employer-employee relations which are based 
(ultimately) on the wage nexus. Thus, employment policy in Koor Industries is dictated by 
the rules applicable to private firms having the declared aim of profit" (p. 85, translated 
from the Hebrew original). 
Koor Industries is similar to a privately owned firm in its quest for profits. Regarding the alloca- 
tion of profits, however, Koor Industries accumulates for its own expansion, rather than dispersing 
most profits as dividends to owners: 
the British In addition, the Histadrut provided the housing and cultural needs of its members 
and a list of public services ranging from education to health. 
That is why Aharoni (1976), who was the first to study the holding groups, only examined Hevrat 
HaOvdim as a business organization and did not even discuss the trade union of the Histadrut. 
That is also why most of the industrial workers in Israel are not associated with the Labour 
Party and the Histadrut, but rather vote for the right-wing Likud political bloc. The Likud 
demanded in its election platform plan to dismantle the Histadrut, or at least to separate 
Hevrat HaOvdim from the trade union. A comprehensive summary of this subject is found in Shapira 
(1975) who describes in detail the reasons for establishing the Histadrut, the formal and latent 
motives, and the evolution of the organization. 
"The orientation towards growth, embedded in the conception and practice of Koor, conse- 
quently implies that distribution of profits in the forms of dividends to Hevrat HaOvdim 
and the Histadrut, was never high on the priority list of Koor's management. Using most 
profits for investment is actually the common rule for any one factory and for the Koor 
group as a whole. The immediate goal of factories in the Histadrut sector as well as in the 
private sector, is the accumulation of economic power, and a minimal dependence on external 
factors" (ibid., p. 90, translated from the Hebrew original). 
And finally, 
"While distribution of profits is of a minute importance, obtaining profits, i.e., net 
positive return on investment, is undoubtedly of a very high priority. Even in the absence 
of other reasons, a positive rate of return of an individual factory, and of Koor as a 
group, is essential for a reliable standing in the financial system. This reliability is a 
conditio sine qua non for capital mobilization in the medium and long term bond market, as 
well as in the commercial and banking credit markets .... Finally, internal financing of 
investment--i.e., allocation of profits for growth--is impossible unless the activity of 
Koor is profitable" (ibid., pp. 91 - 92, translated from the Hebrew original). 
The evolution of the Jewish Agency shares many similarities with that of the Histadrut. The 
Jewish Agency was established for political and philanthropic purposes but such purposes were slowly 
weakened as its economic organizations, like Bank Leumi and Rasko, managed to accumulate profits and 
gained autonomy from its control. 
"With the outgrowth of the economic firms under the complete or partial ownership of the 
Jewish Agency, and with the need to supervise them--the "Office for Firms and Investment" 
was established in 1952 .... In practice, the "Office" has very little control over the 
firms .... According to one of the top officials in the Jewish Agency, a considerable number 
of the firms owned by the Jewish Agency constitute private empires of the group's managers" 
(Aharoni, 1976, p. 150, translated from the Hebrew original). 
The situation closely resembles the relations between the "Executive Committee of the Histadrut" and 
Bank Hapoalim. The bank acted for many years as it separately wished. For instance, the bank took 
over the pension funds of the Histadrut who were compelled to invest in it. Further, Bank Hapoalim 
also forbad the Histadrut's comptroller from any access to its domain. The bank's chairman, Jacob 
Levinson (the son of the Histadrut's treasurer), had an ultimate autonomy over the activity of the 
bank and the usage of its resources. Similarly in Bank Leumi: 
"While in the initial years of operation the bank's policy was dominated by its attachment 
to the Zionist cause, in subsequent years its policy was clearly dictated by strictly 
commercial considerations. The wide scope of the bank's activity and the vigorous per- 
sonality of its managers give it great autonomy. Another factor for this autonomy is the 
fact that the directors of the bank are nominated for life and can not be dismissed" 
(Aharoni, 1976, p. 162, translated form the Hebrew original). 
Formally, the largest shareholder of Bank Leumi is The Jewish National Fund. This firm was es- 
tablished by Herzl in the turn of the century for the purpose of land purchase and development in 
Palestine. Recently, a court rejected legal claims against The Jewish National Fund for not issuing 
controlling shares in Bank Leumi. The "public" holds most of the bank's shares but these shares yield 
only dividends. Effective control remains in the hands of the board of directors that nominates 
itself for life. 
The recent "Bejsicy Commission" (Bejsicy et al, 1986) unveiled Bank Leumi's straw subsidiaries 
and part of its complicated financial activities in Israel and abroad. Similar evidence was presented 
for Bank Hapoalim. The picture that emerges is one in which the banks had litile to do with the 
Zionist cause or with labour unions, but rather they mainly were concerned with profit making.s 
1.2.2 The Government Cornorations 
Until the early 1970s, the Israeli government was a leading entrepreneur in construction, 
electronics, transportation equipment, insurance, shipping, oil refining and more. This was primarily 
due to the government's virtual control over the cheap capital inflow and its allocation. Later, the 
civilian capital inflow and its finance became more expensive and the domestic debt (held mainly by 
the large holding groups) became more difficult to circulate (the present domestic debt exceeds $35 
billion and its finance consumes up to 1/3 of the annual budget). Strained by limited resources, the 
government partially withdrew from business activities in areas such as banking, insurance, consumer 
goods, electrical and electronic equipment and transportation (Aharoni, 1976, pp. 120-126). It became 
increasingly confined to arms production, raw material business, electrical utilities, and water 
supply. Between 1968 and 1972,50 government enterprises were sold (Aharoni, 1976, p. 42) and since 
The commission concluded that the chairmen of Bank Leumi and Bank Hapoalim (as well as other key 
figures in other organizations) had to resign within 30 days. It took a Royal Commission to move 
chairmen E. Yafet (Bank Leumi) and G. Gazit (Bank Hapoalim) from their positions, something that 
even the superstructure organizations above them (the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut) could not 
do. Notably, even the conclusions of the "Bejsicy Commission" were not legally enforceable and 
both Yafet and Gazit stepped down with "courtesy" after the ensuing controversy. 
then 13 more were privatized. Many of the government "withdrawals", however, couId not be explained 
by way of financial difficulties. The government acquired or invested in many of these firms when 
they were in difficulties. Later, when they turned profitable, the government "abandoned" their 
control in favour of the holding groups and other large firms6 However, there are also contrary 
examples to this common phenomenon? 
It appears that the modus operandi of the Israeli Government group is more complex than that of 
the other groups. The government often seems to assist the expansion of the large holding groups. For 
instance, Israeli Aircraft Industries, the country's largest industrial firm (primarily armament 
oriented) continuously reports substantial losses, while its hundreds of subcontractors--most of 
which under the control of the largest holding groups--prosper. On other occasions the Israeli 
Government group acts vigorously as a "private" enterprise. A case in point is the behaviour of 
Israel Chemicals, which is aggressively managed and provides a conspicuous example as the most 
profitable industrial company in Israel. Moreover, while the modus o~erandi of individual government 
enterprises is often different, the modus o~erandi of the Israeli Government group as a whole cannot 
be characterized in abstraction from the wider role the Israeli government assumes in the economy. 
Finally, it is hard to empirically assess the performance of the Israeli Government group in com- 
parison with the other groups, for existing data regarding government enterprises are inadequate. 
1.3 The "Ownership Pers~ective" of Structure 
So far we have introduced the 6 largest holding groups and claimed that--with the possible 
exception of the government--all effectively operate as 'private' businesses, seeking profit and 
asset expansion. More importantly for our purpose, is the significance of these groups regarding the 
question of structure. The common approach to industrial organization and market structure divides 
the economy along the product lines of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). However, the 
Illustrative examples are Rasko, Elbit, Tadiran, Orlite, Zim Lines, several banks and Paz. 
' For instance, the cases of Ashot Askelon and Beit Shemesh Engines. 
position of the large corporate holding groups as leading business concerns in Israel, and their 
significant weight throughout the economy, suggest the use of an alternative approach to economic 
structure. We propose to divide the economy differently--not along product lines but along ownership 
lines. In the common 'production approach', the grouping criteria of different firms proceeds 
according to their principal production activity and its association with one of the many industrial 
branches. For the 'ownership perspective' proposed here, Israeli firms are grouped into 2 categories: 
the largest holding groups dominating the 'Big Economy' and the multitude of smaller h s  and 
unincorporated businesses that operate largely independently from each other and compose the 'Small 
  con om^'.^ In the Israeli case these 'production' and 'ownership' perspectives are quite different as 
we now illustrate. 
Galmor [1984], for example, examined competition patterns in Israeli industry using SIC categor- 
iesg. According to him, in 197213, the 3 leading establishments in each minor branch accounted, as a 
weighted average, for 49% of all industrial output. The comparable international figures cited by 
Galmor were 24% for France, 20% for Italy, 34% for Belgium (using 4 leading establishments in each 
minor branch), and 40% for the U.S.A. (using 4 leading establishment in each sub-branch). Looking 
beyond the average figures, Galmor associated each sub-branch with one of three different "Concentra- 
tion Groups". A sub-branch belonged to the "competitive" group if its leading establishments ac- 
counted for less than 40% of its total output, to the "gray area" if they accounted for 41-60% of 
total output, and to the "non-competitive group" if the leading establishments produced over 61% of 
the sub-branch output. The result are provided in Table 1.1 below. 
Clearly, the division into these 2 groups is not the only possible 'ownership' grouping; We can 
further differentiate between subgroups within each of these 2 groups, or proceed with a 
different division altogether. However, this particular division appears, in our opinion, to 
reflect the dominant institutional structure of the Israeli economy. 
Galmor utilized 197213 data published by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistic and unpublished 
data from the Ministry of Trade and Industry for selected years between 1968 and 1978. 
Table 1.1 
% of Total Industrial Output Produced by Sub-Branches in Group 
"Concentration Group" Israel U.S.A. 
- -- -- -- 
"Competitive" (0-40%) 
"Gray Area" (41-60%) 
"Non-Competitive" (61-100%) 
(Concentration figures refer to 3 leading establishments in Israel and 
to 4 leading establishments in U.S.A.) 
Source: Galmor (1984) p. 11. 
While the "competitive" sector according to these calculations accounted for 56% of industrial 
output in the U.S.A, it accounted for only 8% in Israel. On the other side of the scale, the "non- 
competitive" sector produced only 18% of industrial output in the U.S.A. but 42% in Israel. 
Further, Galmor defines the "Depth of Concentration" as the percentage of total industrial 
output produced by "monopolies" and "oligopolies" (a "monopoly" occurring when one firm accounts for 
50% or more of sub-branch total output, and an "oligopoly" when 3 firms accounting for 60% or more). 
Similarly, the "Breadth of Concentration" is defined as the percentage of sub-branches dominated by 
"monopolies" and "oligopolies". An international comparison based on these definitions is given in 
Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 
Depth and Breadth of Concentration 
U.S.A France Israel 
"Depth of Concentration" 183 % 34.2 % 42 % 
"Breadth of Concentration" 18.6 % 34.1 % 60 % 
Source: Galmor (1984), pp. 13-14. 
This standard examination of the different production branches indicates that Israel's in- 
dustrial structure is highly concentrated by international standards. The problem is that such a 
sectoral view probably conceals more than it reveals. This becomes clearer when we now consider the 
Israeli structure from an 'ownership' perspective. By 1984, when Galmor published his report examin- 
ing individual industrial branches according to SIC breakdown, the 6 largest holding groups have long 
dominated the entire Israeli industry. In that year, according to Dun & Bradstreet Israel (:984), 48 
firms out of Israel's 100 largest industrial enterprises were owned/controlled by Koor Industries (23 
firms), the Israeli Government (9 firms), IDBH (8 firms), and Clal (Israel) (8 firms). These groups 
controlled 28 of the first 50 and 14 of the first 20 largest industrial firms. In the financial 
realm, Bank Leuzi, Bank Hapoalim and IDBH, together with the Israeli Government, accounted for 
approximately 90% banking activity (assets, employment and branches) and a considerable share of the 
insurance, security brokerage and real estate businessa10 
To put the relative weight of these groups in an international perspective, let us aggregate the 
net profits of Israel's 5 biggest (non-government) corporate groups--Bank Hapoalim, Koor Industries, 
Bank Leumi, IDBH, and Clal (Israel)--and refer to these aggregate net profits as "Israel's 5'*.11 Now, 
let us aggregate the net profits of the 650 largest corporations in the U.S.A.: the 500 largest 
industrial firms, the 50 biggest commercial banks, the 50 biggest utilities, and the 50 largest 
retailers.12 We obtain aggregate profits which will be termed "U.S.A's 650"J3 
lo The Bank of Israel, Annual Revort of the Banks' Comotroller, (1981-1984). 
l1 The Israeli Government group is omitted for reasons discussed in section 1.2.2. Minor adjust- 
ments were made in aggregation of the remaining corporate data due to fiscal/calendar differen- 
ces. For further details, see page Part Three, footnote 10. 
l2 Industrial and retailing corporations are ranked by sales, while commercial banks and utilities 
are ranked by total assets. 
l3 Both "U.S.A9s 650" and "Israel's 5" are in current figures (US$ and NIS). 
TABLE 1.3 
An Index for the Relative Size of the Big Economy: 
Israel Versus U.S.A 
U.S.A.'s 650 Israel's 5 
U.S.A.'s GNP Israel's GNP 
Source for Israel's 5: Firms' financial reports. 
Source for U.S.A's 650: Fortune, "Fortune Directory" (July 1965 and August 1965)' "The 500" (May 2, 
1983), "Service 500" (June 1983). 
Table 1.3 compares "U.S.A's 650" and "Israel's 5" with the relevant nominal GNP figures in both 
countries. If our sample size is appropriate in each case, the results give some indication of the 
relative importance of a "representative giant firm" in each market (the percentage figures divided 
by the number of corporate entities). Relatively to their local markets in 1964, an Israeli "rep- 
resentative giant" was already 13 times larger than its U.S.A counterpart. By 1982, 5 groups in 
Israel appropriated roughly the same percentage of GNP as did the 650 largest firms in the U.S.A. In 
that year, an Israeli "representative giant" was relatively 123 times larger than its U.S.A counter- 
part. However, this comparison of concentration still underestimates Israeli concentration for the 
Israeli holding groups are far more diverse in their activities than large corporations in the U.S.A. 
While many large U.S. corporations are confined to one or few areas of activity, the above Israeli 
groups embrace the entire market spectrum. 
Dun & Bradstreet Israel (1984) provides a breakdown by industrial branch which we now use to 
illustrate that diversity. Selected data regarding holding-group domination of these branches are 
reported in Table 1.4. These data do not provide market shares of leading establishments or firms in 
each branch. They do indicate, however, that in terms of ownership/control, each major branch 
operates as an "oligopoly" among the same holding groups. The roads of Bank Leumi, Bank Hapoalim, 
Table 1.4 
Holding Groups Involvement in Selected Branches (1984) 
Leading Firms in Branch and 
Industrial Branch the Holding Groups that Own/Control Them 
Aerospace and Shipyards lst, 2nd (Israeli Government) 
Textile and Fashion 2nd, 3rd, 7th (Clal, Leumi, Hapoalim, IDBH) 
Building Products lst, 3rd, 5th, 7th (Koor Industries, Clal) 
Energy and 
Infrastructure 
lst, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th (Israeli Government, Leumi, Hapoalim, IDBH ) 
Chemical and Minerals lst, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5 t h  9th (Israeli Government, Koor Industries) 
Food Beverages and 5th, 6 th  9 t h  10th (Koor Industries, Clal) 
Tobacco 
Wood and Paper Products 1st (IDBH) 
Electrical Products and lst, 2nd, 3rd, 4 th  5th, 6 th  8th (Koor Industries, IDBH, Clal) 
Electronics 
Metal Products lst, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 10th (Koor Industries, D B H ,  Clal) 
Leasing lst, 2nd, 4th (Bank Leumi, IDBH, Clal) 
Commercial Banking lst, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th (Leumi, Hapoalim, IDBH) 
Investment Banking lst, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th (Israeli Government, Leumi, Hapoalim, IDBH) 
Mortgage Banking 2nd, 3rd, 4 th  10th (Leumi, Hapoalim, IDBH) 
Insurance lst, 2nd, 3rd, 9th (Leumi, Hapoalim, IDBH, Clal) 
Source: Dan & Bradstreet Israel. 1984. Dun's 100: Israel's Largest Industrial Entemrises, pp. 100- 
123. 
(IDBH), Koor Industries, the Israeli Government group and Clal (Israel) repeatedly converge in almost 
each branch. 
Beyond this simple picture of concentration, we must note more complex ownership/control ties 
among the holding groups14, reciprocal buying and selling arrangements, financing relations among the 
banks, the government and the industrial groups, property rights enjoyed exclusively by the largest 
groups and, finally, explicit collusion15. Of utmost importance in this regard are the family ties 
and informal relations among the people who own and control the largest holding groups.16 These types 
of interaction most likely enhance concentration, but the qualitative nature of such concentration is 
rarely reflected in any indexes based solely on financial data 
The importance of the 'ownership approach' to the Israeli case extends also beyond the area of 
industrial structure and into the question of broad "macroeconomic" developments of the Israeli 
economy. 
"The holding groups and large firms decrease in number, increase in concentration and 
mutual ties and become more interdependent with the government. Ministers and civil 
servants have a substantial informal influence on these groups which are the ones who often 
enjoy tax and credit concessions. These groups also influence, or at least try to in- 
fluence, government policy. While they depend considerably on the government, the govern- 
ment is also dependent on them to achieve its economic goals. The holding-group system 
enjoyed most of the capital resources allocated by the government. In fact, as these lines 
are written (May, 1975) it appears that government offices lost a considerable part of 
their power. The large groups have substantial influence on the economic policy and on the 
allocation of the country's resources. The government is often dependent on them in its 
policies" (Aharoni, 1976, pp. 116-118, trans. from the Hebrew original). 
l4 These were documented in Aharoni (1976), but since then, with the Gilded Age of the stock 
market, mutual ownership interaction has increased much further. As indicated by Bejsky et al. 
(1986), the demarcation lines among the various groups became increasingly blurred (pp. 22,35, 
38,40,73-4,82,102,159 and more). 
l5 For instance, in June, 1984 the four largest banks were sued for collusion in setting the 
interest rate on liquid deposits (Magistrate Court, Jerusalem, T.P. No. 2136/84, June 3, 1984). 
l6 For a historical and institutional discussion in this regard, see Frenkel and Bichler (1984) and 
Kotler (1984). The theoretical analysis of informal interrelations is very difficult, par- 
ticularly since quantitative categories in this area are often open to different interpreta- 
tions. This, in turn, further complicates the question of effective corporate ownership/control 
(cf. Zeitlin, 1974). 
However, despite their significance, Israeli holding groups have been largely ignored in the 
economic literature. Even simple questions remained unanswered. In this paper we purport to briefly 
examine the following issues: 
(i) How do the holding groups perform? Are their performances similar? In terms of performance, can 
we consider the various holding groups as part of one 'unified' group or are there several sub- 
groups? 
(ii) Do the holding groups perform differently from the rest of the business sector? 
(iii) What is the share accounted for by the large holding groups in industry or economy aggregates 
such as sales, value added, employees and profits? What has been the historical evolution of these 
aggregate 'concentraticn' indexes? 
Before we can effectively examine these questions we need to evaluate the data available for 
this purpose. This we do in the following part of the essay. 
2. THE DATA SET 
This part is divided in two sections. First, we consider the corporate financial data and 
responses to the Industry and Craft Survey. In the other section, we outline the data difficulties at 
the macroeconomic level. These considerations are important for data reliability is often ques- 
tionable and care must be taken in interpretation of empirical results. 
2.1 The Comorate and Industrv Data 
2.1.1 The Comorate Data 
There are four possible sources of financial data regarding the large corporate holding groups: 
corporate financial reports to shareholders, corporate reports to the Income Tax Commission, the 
Income Tax Commission assessments, and the adjusted figures used in constructing the National Income 
Accounts estimates. Furthermore, these reports can be denominated in Israeli nominal terms, in "real" 
terms or expressed in foreign currency. Each of these combinations provides different numbers for 
similar categories. Which figure is the "appropriate" one depends on the purpose for which the 
numbers are used. In our case the choice was simple: the Income Tax Commission data (corporate 
reports to the Commission and the Commission's own assessments) are unavailable, and the CBoS does 
not publish corporate income figures so no data base is available there either. Hence our examination 
must be confined to figures extracted from firms' financial reports to shareholders. The question now 
is how closely do the financial reports to shareholders reflect corporate performance. According to 
Aharon Dovrat, the chairman of Clal (Israel), neither this nor the other forms of reports provide a 
valid picture of the c~rporation.~ This particular view, of course, does not resolve the question and 
"The accounting method in Israel has gone bankrupt [...I In the Clal group, four financial 
reports are prepared: nominal, in U.S. dollar, adjusted to inflation, and a financial report for 
tax purposes. Neither of these is capable of reflecting the group's condition" (HaAretz, April 
13, 1984, trans.) 
does not indicate an alternative mean of evaluating corporate performance. Corporate financial 
reports are the only available data source as far as corporate income and capital are concerned, and 
they are the ones used in the preparation of the national income accounts (see the guidelines in 
United Nations, A Svstem of National Accounts, 1968, pp. 81-82). Since, as will be noted in section 
2.2 below, the Israeli national income distribution has not been mapped for years subsequent to 1954, 
these problems did seem to constitute a major concern for Israeli economists. For us the evaluation 
of financial reports is a prerequisite to further assessment. The issue is, of course, complex and we 
do not attempt to resolve it, but rather to highlight the main difficulties that arise in the Israeli 
circumstance. These fall under three main headings: (i) consolidation principles and the "boundaries" 
of the corporation, (ii) the effect of inflation on the financial figures, and (iii) reliability of 
reports. 
(i) Consolidation vrincivles. Large corporations in Israel conventionally consolidate their 
accounts only with "subsidiaries" in which they hold over 50% of the voting shares. The reports of 
other "affiliated" companies are not consolidated with the parent's accounts, but are reflected in 
them on an equity basis. The rationale behind this consolidation convention is fully accepted by the 
U.N. in its recommendations for iden-ng the transactors of the Income and Outlay and Capital 
Accounts: 
"For most purposes, the transactors wanted are those who independently direct and manage 
the receipt and disposition of income, the accumulation of property, and borrowing and 
lending. This leads to statistical units consisting of families of incorporated or quasi-- 
corporate enterprises which as a result of ties of ownership, are controlled and managed by 
the same interests. Using the family of entities will also avoid showing formal transac- 
tions and links between the entities, which are not meaningful economically. The families 
may be defined as consisting of the entities, the majority, that is 50 per cent or more, of 
the equity (shares or other forms of capital participation) of each of which is owned by 
the same interest" (United Nations, A System of National Accounts, 1968, p. 81). 
The above approach is based on two principles. (a) "Meaningful" economic transactions are only 
those made at arm's length between "independent" transactors. In the background of this approach, we 
detect the axioms of a competitive market structure, in which transactions are made at "market 
prices" (equilibrium prices perhaps) determined by market forces. When the will of one or more of the 
transactors becomes a major market force in itself, the price in no longer a "market price" and the 
transaction is not economically meaningful (ibid. pp. 72, 94, and many other places, where it is 
suggested that such transactions be revaluated at the "appropriate" [?I market price). (b) The power 
to distort arm's length, economically-meaningful transactions between related companies is exercised 
only in the context of one holding 50% or more of the voting rights in the other. 
There are serious problems with this common consolidation convention and the rationale behind 
it. Using a 50% ownership as a control threshold for big Israeli holding groups imposes a strong 
downward bias to the consolidated figures. If these reports are assumed to reflect the effective 
control of the parent over resources, a substantially lower threshold, 15% or 20% say, is more 
appropriate. Much of the hierarchical corporate structure in Israel's big economy exists with voting 
rights significantly lower than 50%. Further, not all groups publish consolidated reports. Only in 
1970, for example, when IDBH was established as its formal holding corporation, did the Discount 
group start to publish consolidated reports. The Israeli Government does not properly consolidate its 
reports2 and Hevrat HaOvdim, as a formal parent entity for Bank Hapoalim, Koor Industries and 
numerous other enterprises, does not publish any financial reports! 
But even a lower voting threshold and a proper holding-group consolidation are insufficient to 
establish the groups of "independent units" which are engaged in "meaningful economic transactions" 
at market prices. How mutually independent are Bank Hapoalim, Bank Leumi, IDBH, Koor Industries and 
Clal (Israel)? How independent are they from the Government? If their mutual interdependence acts as 
a criterion, not many transactions in Israel are "economically meaningful" by the United Nations' 
standard. Alternatively, every transaction is meaningful. The question is whether it properly 
reflects a movement of resources, income or assets, rather than an accounting exercise lacking any 
such dimension. 
The "Government Corporations Authority" that formally controls the operation of government 
enterprises, publishes collected figures. These, however, are based on simple aggregation and do 
not follow the accounting principles of consolidation. Furthermore--as indicated several times 
by the State Comptroller--the financial reports of large government enterprises are often simply 
falsified in order to conceal continuous losses. 
(ii) The effect of inflation on the financial firmres. For our purpose, non-arm's length 
transactions do not constitute the principal obstacle. The problem lies elsewhere, specifically with 
the money unit in which transactions are recorded. Accounting conventions rely heavily on the 
assumption of stable relations between money and other commodities; in other words, on stable prices. 
Inflation, and especially rapid inflation, impose a serious difficulty. The first "distortions" 
appear in the quotation of asset values. The conservative bias of accounting conventions holds asset 
values down at their purchase price until these assets are "realized". This causes "total assets" 
figures to underestimate the "realizable value" of the underlying properties. With annual inflation 
at three-digit figures, fixed assets and financial portfolios recorded at historical cost or book 
value, represent only a very small fraction of their "market value" (which in Israel might have very 
little to do with a competitive equilibrium). The order of this gap has been maintained even after 
the stock market collapse in 1983. This problem is much reduced, however, with respect to the "total 
assets" of the banks since these are mainly composed of deposits and obligations, which are largely 
indexed to the CPI or the US$. 
Another important bias appears in the net profit figure. Many claims have been voiced on the 
extent to which those profits are "paper profits" rather than actual ones. The basis for such claims 
runs as follows. Annual profits are calculated as a difference between current revenues from selling 
products and historical costs incurred in the production of those products. With stable prices or 
even low inflation, the money unit of measure can be considered as having approximately the same 
"purchasing power" throughout the year. This approximation, however, is no longer valid under rapid 
inflation. Here the difference between current revenues and the related historical costs is in- 
fluenced more by the depreciation in the value of money during the year than by the "real" gains of 
producers. In order to properly reflect annual profits, all revenues and cost incurred through the 
year must first be "adjusted" for inter-year price changes and denominated in "constant" prices--for 
instance, in terms of the price level prevailing in a particular month in that year. Since the annual 
cost-income structure of modem multi-product firms is complex, each item has to be adjusted 
separately using proper accounting conventions. Only then can the "adjusted" annual profits be 
calculated. Note that these "adjusted" profits are still "nominal" annual figures since they are 
denominated in prices prevailing in that particular year. In order to be able to compare "real" 
profits between two different years we need to deflate the two "adjusted" nominal profits by the 
corresponding levels of an appropriate annual price index 
This process is considered important: it is claimed that the resulting "adjusted" figures, once 
deflated by the CPI, often reveal "real" losses, while the unadjusted nominal numbers (deflated by 
the CPI too) would indicate "real" profits. As we demonstrate in Part Three below, this does not 
appear to be the case with respect to the largest holding groups. Both methods of "real" profit 
measurements--the unadjusted nominal profit figures deflated by the CPI and the "adjusted" figures 
deflated by the CPI--have similar signs and move in the same direction. However, there are different 
considerations that are potentially of a greater significance for our purpose: capital gains and 
index linkages on principals which have not (yet) been "realized" are considered as changes in equity 
rather than components of profits, and thus are not reflected in the income statements. These items 
grow substantially with inflation, and so too does the underestimation of pretax profit they entail. 
Further, financial reports to shareholders quote nominal tax obligations. When these obligations are 
not fully indexed to the (rapid) inflation they can be reduced to insignificant amounts by the time 
they are actually paid. As a result, reported net profit can often greatly underestimate the actual 
net profit, a bias which increases with inflation. 
(iii) Reliabilitv of reuorts. It is often argued that some corporations and the accounting firms 
representing them manipulate and falsify their financial reports (numerous examples are provided in 
Shmueli, 1970). Many of these cases suggest, however, that for a particular firm the deviation of the 
reported figures from the corresponding "objective" facts often follows a general pattern throughout 
the years. It might be that report "adaptation" conforms with certain methods "traditionally" pursued 
by the accounting firm. If this "stable adaptation" hypothesis is valid, the pattern of report 
manipulation or falsification is reinforced the longer is the contract between the corporation and 
its particular accounting firm. The opposite can be said when a corporation frequently alters its 
accounting fmn and with it changes the pattern of its report manipulation. Since their establish- 
ment, none of the large holding groups we surveyed replaced its accounting firm. Thus, if the general 
argument presented in this paragraph is correct, much of the possible falsification could be 
"trended" if reports were inspected for a sufficiently long period of time. 
To summarize: the principles of consolidation underestimate the scope of resources controlled by 
Israel's large holding groups; for non-bank corporations, "total assets" values are seriously 
underestimated by the reported figures; "net profits" are most probably underestimated; report 
reliability is questionable but the bias is likely proportional to the overall order of the figures. 
These general statements appear to be a plausible starting point for using the corporate data derived 
from shareholders reports. 
2.1.2 The Industrv and Craft Sumev Data 
An alternative source of data with which to examine corporate performance is the Industry and 
Crafts Survey, conducted annually by the CBoS. There are several differences between these data and 
the corporate data based on shareholders reports. These differences involve (i) the surveyed popula- 
tion, (ii) data sources, and (iii) the categories for which data are availabje. Despite these 
differences, the Survey's data are still very useful in examining aggregate concentration and in 
confirming results obtained on the basis of shareholders' reports. 
(i) The surveved ~o~ula t ion .  While the holding groups' financial reports reflect, at least in 
principle, their entire range of activity, the Industry and Crafts Survey is limited to units whose 
main activity is in the 'mining' or 'manufacturing' branches only (as defined by the SIC). Further, 
while the corporate data are defined along ownership lines, the Survey's data refers to "establish- 
ments" which are identified by production criteria3 This means that a group like Koor Industries 
"The investigation unit is defined as an economic unit (like a mine, a factory or a workshop) ... 
An establishment in this sense is generally located on one site and is engaged in one economic 
activity" (CBoS, Industrv and Crafts Survev. 1983, p. XII). 
does not appear here as one entity but rather as hundreds of apparently independent factories 
operating in various 'branches'. The data are not attached to identified units but are aggregated by 
sector, type of ownership (private, government and Histadrut), size, etcO4 
(ii) Data sources. While the corporate data is derived from financial reports to shareholders, 
the Survey data are based on the assessments made by the Income Tax Commission with some adjustments 
by the CBoS. 
(iii) Data categories. The CBoS started to provide Income Statement data only in its 1979180 
survey. These were nominal figures. In the 1983/4 survey, it started to "adjust" the numbers for 
inflation and discontinued reporting of the nominal figures. But most importantly, these Income 
Statement data are provided for major SIC branches only and are not broken down by establishment 
size. 
The Survey also provides an alternative set of data reported almost regularly since 1964. This 
set does not provide Income Statement data but it still contains other valuable information. It 
includes the categories of employed persons, wages and related labour expenses, consumption of 
materials, value added, gross output, and revenues. These categories are broken down by SIC branch, 
establishment size and by establishment size within each branch. 
2.2 Macroeconomic Data 
As claimed in Part One, the frame of reference for an empirical study of the large Israeli 
holding groups should be the national economy. There are, however, serious data difficulties also at 
the macroeconomic level. These arise because (i) Israel has no complete National Income Accounts, and 
(ii) the Expenditures Accounts are seriously biased by the 'Black Economy', on the size of which 
there is no reliable information. We outline each of these points in turn. 
Israel has detailed National Expenditure Accounts estimating consumption, investment, government 
The CBoS has a database with the information of individual establishments. These data are not 
publicly available. 
spending, exports and imports from 1950. There are also several unofficial estimates for the pre- 
Independence period and the early years of the State. But unlike the Expenditure accounts, Israel has 
no official National Income Accounts. The overall distribution of wages, profits, rent and interest 
was estimated only once, for the period of 1950-4 (Creamer, 1957)? The Bank of Israel and the 
Ministry of Finance prepare their own occasional estimates but these are never published, partly 
because their reliability is questioned even by those who prepare theme6 
Most of the income statistics that do exist are estimated indirectly from the Expenditure Acc- 
ounts. The difficulty here is that estimates of the GNP and its components are biased due to the 
existence of a very substantial 'Black ~conomy'? There is no unanimity regarding the size of this 
'Black Economy' a'd its evolution over time, as can be seen from Table 2.1. 
There are no available estimates of this size for the 1980s but it is highly likely that it has 
grown further relatively to the official GNP? Since existing income-distribution data are derived 
indirectly from the GNE accounts, they, like the official accounts, are also biased to an unknown 
degree. 
* Several other studies of income distribution were subsequently conducted by Zandberg (1956), 
Hanoch (1960) and Ben-Shahar (1961). Official government reports on income distribution were 
prepared by The Commission for Inquiry into the Distribution of National Income (1970) and the 
Zukerrnan Commission (1975). However, these studies and reports used different definition, 
covered different and limited time periods, and were of various degrees of depth. Most impor- 
tantly, these studies commonly excluded income earned by institutional units, namely corporate income. 
Nadel (1975) cites a Bank of Israel economist in this regard: "Currently (1975) there are no 
reliable estimates of national income distribution between employees, entrepreneurs and firms. A 
serious, reliable and detailed estimate does not exist at all, not for any single year (pp. 222- 
223, trans. from Hebrew original). 
This refers to production of and income from illegal or unreported business activity which is 
excluded from the official GNP estimates. 
The 'liberalization' of the economy by the L ihd  after 1977, the prosperity of the stock market 
and the effective deregulation of foreign currency flows probably contributed significantly in 
this direction. 
Table 2.1 
The 'Black Economy' as a % of the GNP: Selected Estimates 
(1955-1977) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year Ben-Shahar Mishory Unger and Nadel 
et al. 
- and Tal Zilberferb 
Source: (1) Ben Shahar et al. (1975) pp. 3.6, 3.10 
(2) (3) Unger and Zilberferb (1983) pp. 8, 10. 
(4) Nadel (1975) p. 38. 
As noted, there are no systematic estimates of overall income distribution in general, or agg- 
regate corporate income in particular. In this work below, we make use of 2 aggregate income series 
estimated by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBoS) and published by the Bank of Israel. These 
are aggregate "factor income" and aggregate "capital income" of the business sector. The first is 
equal to the NNP of the business sector? The second is calculated by subtracting compensation of 
employees from aggregate "factor income" of the business sector. These are pretax figures. Net income 
must also be estimated indirectly. We can do this by subtracting the actual tax payments by cor- 
porations and unincorporated businesses from the corresponding income figures. 
Including the imputed subsidy component in government loans for domestic production. 
3. AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION: 1964-1986 
In this part we first assess the performances of Israel's largest holding groups, then we 
compare these to the rest of the business sector and, finally, we evaluate the groups' relative 
weight in various aggregates throughout the 1964-1986 period. In order to arrive at a consistent and 
continuous data set for the holding groups, we had to substitute depth for breadth and limit the 
variables being analyzed. 
It is common to evaluate corporate performance on the basis of 4 main indexes: "total assets", 
"sales", "pretax profit" and "net profit". Our analysis is limited to the pretax and net profit 
performance. This choice was influenced by the three main considerations: (i) the "total asset" 
figures of the shareholders' reports are stated in historical cost and cannot be revaluated without 
painstaking research, particularly for the "industrial" groups; furthermore, we have no comparable 
figures for other corporations or for the economy as a whole, figures against which the holding 
groups' performances can be assessed, (ii) "sales" figures are not available on a consistent and 
uninterrupted basis, and (iii) "profits" are often regarded as the 'ultimate' goal of business 
activity and are perhaps a more sensitive "barometer" to corporate success or failure than "assets" 
or "sales". 
The examination here refers to the 5 largest holding groups, excluding the Israeli Governments1 
These 5 groups provide 6 annual reports: Bank Hapoalim, Bank Leumi, Koor Industries and Clal (Israel) 
produce 4 comprehensive reports. IDBH started to publish consolidated reports only in 1970, so we use 
here the reports of its 2 principal branches: Israel Discount Bank and Discount Investment 
Corporation (DIC). With the exception of Bank Hapoalim all figures are for consolidated operations. 
(Bank Hapoalim started to consolidate its accounts only in 1972, so we use the unconsolidated figures 
The Israeli Government group is excluded altogether for lack of appropriate and reliable data, 
as well as the unresolved question of its modus operandi (see section 1.2.2). 
which are available since 1964.~) Such limitations affect the absolute figures but probably have very 
little impact on the temporal behaviour of the profit variables. 
3.1 The Performances of the Large Holdinn Grouus 
The issue to be explored here is whether or not the different holding groups (defined according 
to the available data) are similar in their performances. This is a crucial question. If the holding 
groups' ex-post performances are similar, much of the debate regarding their ex-ante modus operandi 
is redundant. A similar development of their performance will permit us to cluster the holding groups 
together as one coherent club of business organizations. This will further clear the way for the next 
stage, where we divide the business sector into two distinct "sectors"--the holding groups and all 
the other businesses--and compare their performance. 
3.1.1 pin Initial Look 
Since accounting conventions differ between "financial" and "industrial" groups it is convenient 
to start by examining each category in turn? Figures 3.la and 3.1b plot the unadjusted net profit of 
each of the 6 corporate entities deflated by CPI! Because of a disparity in the absolute figures 
between the different groups, the data are normalized in terms of standard deviations of each time 
series from its average. In both figures we can distinguish between two periods, 1964-1976 and 1977- 
1986. The first period presents a relatively steady rise for both "industrial" and "financial 
groups". The second period is characterized by a robust expansionary trend in net profits of all 
groups until 1982, followed by marked fluctuations until 1986. We examine each period in turn. 
Note, however, that due to the equity method of accounting, the consolidated and unconsolidated 
net profits are identical). 
This does not imply that "financial" groups are not involved in "industrial" activity or that 
the "financial" groups are independent from the "industrial" ones. 
The choice of the CPI is conventional. In principle, a more "appropriate" deflator might have 
been the GNE deflator since these groups reinvest in all spheres of activity and their "invest- 
ment basket" changes through time. In practice, as a result of hyper inflation, the CPI (fixed 
Paasche-based basket of consumer purchases) and the GNP deflator (fixed Laspeyres-based basket 
of GNE components) behave almost identically. 
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Figure 3.2a and 3.2b refer to the "industrial" groups. In the first period, the upward profit 
trend is similar for the 3 groups (with Koor Industries fluctuating around the trend more than Clal 
(Israel) and DIC). Similarity in the upward trend and deviations continues, in fact, until 1982. 
Subsequently, the profit trend is reversed for all 3 groups and aside from the 1982-1983 interval the 
deviations of the 3 groups are similar. Figures 3.3a and 3.3b describe the net profits development of 
the "financial" groups in the two periods. Here, the similarity in performance is even more striking 
than with the "industrial" groups. Until 1970 the annual profits of all 3 "financial" groups were 
relatively stable. The expansion trend begun in 1971 and continued until 1982 (notably, until 1977, 
Israel Discount Bank fluctuated more than the other two but, since then, the profits of all three 
moved together). As with the "industrial" groups, this trend ended in 1983 when the "financial" 
groups started to experience strong profit fluctuations. (Excluding the 1984-1985 period, the 3 
groups continued to deviate in the same direction.) 
It  seems that the net profits of Koor Industries, DIC and Clal (Israel), on the one hand, and 
those of Bank Leumi, Bank Hapoalim and Israel Discount Bank, on the other, behave sufficiently alike 
that we can cluster them as 2 coherent groups. The next question is how do the "industrial" groups 
compare with the "financial" ones. Each of these groups is involved in all spheres of activity and 
all are further tied together in numerous ways. Is this reflected in similar performances of "in- 
dustrial" and "financial" groups? Figures 3.4a and 3.4b reveal several interesting relations: 
(i) Overall, the net profit performance of "industrial" and "financial" groups are very similar. 
(ii) While it is less surprising to discover similarities until 1977 because growth was relatively 
moderate, it appears that "synchronization" was maintained until 1983, even when growth was much 
faster. 
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(iii) Eventually, this became difficult to sustain5 Following the withdrawal from Lebanon and the 
recessionary government policy, the interests of the "industrial" and "financial" groups diverged, as 
the figures make clear.6 
3.1.2 Alternative Perspectives to the Holding Groups' Performances 
So far our analysis of holding groups' profit was based on the unadjusted nominal figures 
deflated by the CPI. It has been often claimed (see section 2.1.1) that the unadjusted nominal profit 
figures are incapable of accurately portraying business results under hyper-inflation, and that the 
profit figures "adjusted" for inter-year inflation indicate a drastically different picture. It is 
interesting, therefore, to compare "real" profits based on the unadjusted and "adjusted" series. 
Unfortunately, inflation-adjusted reports have been available only since 1984, so any conclusions 
based on such a comparison are necessarily limited. The exact method of adjustment is often obscured 
in the reports but scattered explanations indicate that adjustments are commonly based on a simple 
deflation of beginning and end-year figures by the respective monthly CPI or by the monthly exchange 
value of the U.S d ~ l l a r . ~  
Figures 3.5a and 3.5b compare the adjusted and unadjusted series for the "industrial" and 
"financial" groups, respectively (all nominal series are deflated by the 1980-based CPI). The data 
presented in these figures do not indicate a dramatic difference between the temporal behaviour of 
the 2 net profit series. For both "industrial" and "financial" groups the series move in the same 
direction. It is evident, however, that the 2 series change at a different rate: between 1984 and 
1985, aggregate "real" net industrial profit decreased by 157% according to the "adjusted" figures, 
The difficulties in synchronization among the elites is apparent in Bejsky, et al. (1986), 
although, of course, this was not the intended message of the Commission. 
This was also reflected in rhetoric. By 1985 the "financiers" demanded higher interest rates and 
'balanced budget', while the "industrialists" praised the virtues of lower interest rates and 
continued investment and growth. 
For instance, see IDBH, Annual Re~ort ,  1986, p. 8, and Bank Leumi, Annual Reoort, 1986. In 1985, 
Koor Industries moved from the U.S. dollar to the CPI as a deflator, "in order to eliminate 
'distortions' in the financial report" (Koor Industries, Annual Report, 1986, p. 8). 
FIGURE 3.5a 
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FIGURE 3.5b 
"Financial" Holding Groups: "Adjusted" and ZJnadjusted Net Profits (Thousand 1980 NIS) 
but only by 81% according to the unadjusted figures. In the "financialw-groups case, the rates of 
change were closer: between 1985 and 1986, the aggregate "real" net profits fell by 89% according to 
the "adjusted" series and by 67% if we follow the unadjusted numbers. Furthermore, there are sig- 
nificant differences in the absolute profit levels indicated by the 2 series. (Note that it was the 
"adjusted" series which turned an "industrial" loss into profit.) Of course, these observations 
cannot lead to conclusions regarding the accuracy of unadjusted profits in prior years. However, 
while the figures move together, the discrepancies in the rates of change and in the absolute profit 
magnitudes suggest that both series be considered as general indicators rather than accurate numbers. 
The evolution of the "industrial" holding groups' pretax profit can be compared with an alterna- 
tive time series for large business units, based on the CBoS Industry and Craft Survey. As noted in 
Part Two, pretax profit data are published in the Survey only since 1979180 and are not broken down 
by establishment size. Instead, we use here an index labeled "surplus" which--unlike the Survey 
income statement data--is available for different establishment-size categories. "Surplus" is derived 
from the Survey data by subtracting from "census domestic product at factor cost" the sum of "wages, 
salaries and other labour expenses" and "consumption of materials, fuel, electricity, etc.". Accord- 
ing to this definition, the "surplus" includes establishments' pretax profit, depreciation, general 
expenses (advertizing, interest, insurance, etc.), subsidies and export benefits. Here, we examine 
"surplus" data for establishments with 300 or more employees, which is the largest size-category 
available from the Survey. 
Before we can compare these data to the shareholders' report figures, one should note several 
differences between the two data series, involving (i) the components of "surplus" and pretax profit, 
(ii) the type of business unit under comparison and (iii) the reporting period. 
(i) Differences in the corn~onents of "sumlus" and ~retax profit. The definition of "surplus" 
is wider than that of pretax profit. It contains, in addition to pretax profit, both depreciation and 
general expenses. What are the relative magnitudes of these additional components? We can provide 
only an indirect estimate based on the Survey's income statement data. (These data cover the entire 
population of establishments with 5 or more employees rather than the "300 plus" group in which we 
are interested.) Also, only general expenses are detailed in the Survey, while depreciation figures 
are unavailable. The industry ratio between pretax profit to general expenses was 0.417 in 198112 and 
0.399 in 198213.~ The ratio of pretax profit to general expenses and depreciation is, obviously, even 
smaller. However, what is important for our purpose here is not so much the relative share of pretax 
profit in "surplus" but the stability of this share: if the share of pretax profit in "surplus" is 
stable, the two series will move together. Unfortunately, this cannot be resolved with available 
data Although the two figures we have are very close, there is no assurance that this stability was 
the overall pattern in prior periods, or that this industry stability also holds for the large- 
establishment groups when considered separately. Nevertheless, we can expect the absolute size of the 
"surplus" as a whole to fluctuate much more than the relative share of each of its components. This 
means that changes in overall "surplus" reflect similar changes in pretax profit as well as in the 
other "surplus" components. 
(ii) The business unit under consideration. The shareholders' reports refer to holding groups 
while the Survey data reports on establishments. What is the correspondence between establishments 
with over 300 employees and the holding groups? The Survey does not identify the large establishments 
so no definite answer can be provided here? We can, however, make the following indirect observa- 
tions. As already indicated, most of the large establishments in Israel are held by the 6 largest 
holding groups (including the Israeli Government). Several large establishments are obviously held by 
big firms other than the 6 largest holding groups but these are peripheral to the core of holding 
groups. The next question is why should we only examine establishments with over 300 employees and 
ignore those with, say, 100-299 employees? The reason is that establishments included in the "300 
plus" category employ considerably more than 300 workers. The average employment size per establish- 
CBoS, Industry and Craft S u m  1982, pp. 33,36. 
Note that with research one can identify some of these establishments. There are currently about 
160 establishments with over 300 employees, and the Survey's SIC breakdown quotes much smaller 
numbers in each branch. 
ment in this category was 550 employees in 196415, 614 in 1969170, 814 in 1979180 and 856 in 198314. 
This means that establishments in the "300 plus" category are much larger in the aggregate than 
establishments in the preceding size category of 100-299 employees. The holding groups also control 
establishments with less than 300 employees but the bulk of their business is conducted y& the 
larger establishments. All in all, it seems plausible to consider the "300 plus" category of estab- 
lishments as composing the core of the holding groups' industrial activity. The validity of this 
supposition is strengthen by the results presented below. 
(iii) The reuortina ueriod. The shareholders reports, with two minor exceptions, refer to a 
calender year ending December 31." The Survey's data are for a fiscal year ending March 31.". 
Unfortunately, without additional details (such as quarterly figures) very little can be done to 
bring these 2 series into the same annual basis without introducing a further unknown bias. 
Figure 3.6a compares "surplus" of a 'representative' establishment with 300 or more employees 
(i.e., average "surplus" per establishment) with aggregate pretax profit of the 3 "industrial" 
holding groups [Koor Industries, DIC and Clal (1srael)].12 The temporal behaviour of these two series 
is remarkably close (both series are normalized in terms of standard deviations from their mean). 
This (i) strengthen our hypothesis regarding the "identity" between the "300 plus" establishments and 
the holding groups, and (ii) since the "surplus" data are based on Income Tax Commission assessments, 
the similarity between the two series indicates that the shareholders' reports are not a mere 
accounting artifact. 
lo Koor Industries, and DIC reported on a fiscal-year basis until 1967 and 1969 respectively. We 
converted these data to a calender-year basis by computing a weighted average assuming that 
profit flows are evenly distributed through the original reporting periods. Since inflation was 
low in those years, the possible bias is small. 
l1 The Survey's raw data contain both fiscal-year and calender-year based reports. Subsequently, 
the CBoS converts the calender-year based reports into a fiscal-year basis. The CBoS method of 
conversion is also based on an arbitrary weighing formula 
l2 The holding-groups' financial figures are deflated by the average annual CPI between January to 
December, while the Survey's figures are deflated by the average CPI between April to March. 
This convention is used throughout the analysis. 
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A different comparison is given in Figure 3.6b. Here we compare the holding groups' "industrial" 
pretax profits not with the average but with the aggregate "surplus" of all establishments with over 
300 employees (expressed as standard deviations from mean). The point is that although the number of 
"300 plus" establishments increased from 72 in 1964/5, to 164 in 1983/4, the holding groups' control 
over such establishments in fact increased through- that period merger and acquisition. If this is 
so, the aggregate figures for all "300 plus" establishments should be a closer approximation to the 
holding groups' performance than figures for a 'representative' establishment of the "300 plus" 
category. Here, again, we find a close similarity between the two series. 
A final question regards the relations between pretax and net profit. The comparison of share- 
holders' report data with the Survey's data indicated similarities between the pretax figures from 
both sources. Can we conclude that the shareholders' report provide reliable net profit figures as 
well? (Note that what matters is not so much the absolute numbers but their temporal behaviour.) We 
can try to address this question indirectly on the basis of Figure 3.7 which plots the aggregate 
pretax and net profit of the 3 large "industrial" groups (standard deviations from mean). What does 
FIGURE 3.7 
"Industrial" Holding Groups: Pretax Versus Net Profit (Thousand 1980 Prices) 
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the close proximity in the movement of the two series tells us? If the ratio of pretax to net profit 
is similar for both the shareholders' reports and the Income Tax Commission data, and if the (share- 
holders' report) pretax figures are indeed reliable (as indicated by the comparison with the Survey's 
data based on the Income Tax Commission sources), then a close movement of pretax and net figures 
means that the net figures based on the shareholders' reports are reliable to some extent as well. 
The net figures of the shareholders' report may still contain an absolute bias but their temporal 
mgvement is most probably close to that of the net figures based on the Income Tax Commission 
assessment. 
3.1.3 Conclusions 
(i) The profit performance of the 3 holding groups within each category-tne "industrial" and 
"Enancial1*--are remarkably similar. (ii) Moreover, until 1982, these two clusters can be perceived 
as moving together. From the profit perspective they behaved as one coherent group until there 
interests diverged from 1983 onward. (iii) The nominal shareholders' reports data are not drastically 
different from the adjusted figures, at least for 1984-6. The fluctuation in "industrial" holding- 
groups' profits (based on shareholders' reports) are also confirmed by a comparison with the "sur- 
plus" of large establishments (based on the alternative data source of the Industry and Craft 
Survey). 
The next question is whether or not the holding-groups cluster, as a whole, performs differently 
from the other business entities in the economy. Can we affirm the hypothesis of two different 
"ownership sectors": the 'Big Economy' dominated by the holding groups on the one hand, and the 
'Small Economy' composed of numerous independent firms, on the other? In what way do the performances 
of these two "sectors" differ? This is dealt with in the following section. 
3.2 Business Performances: the 'Big Economv' Versus the 'Small Economv' 
The comparison here is divided in 2 parts. First we examine the Industry and Craft Survey data 
which enable us to compare performances by establishment size. Then we compare the holding groups 
performances as a whole with indirect estimates for the rest of the business sector. 
3.2.1 Industrv: Large Versus Small Establishments 
The analytical unit with which we start is the 'representative' establishment. We consider 
results for 2 types of establishments: an average establishment employing more than 300 employees and 
an average establishment employing less than 300 employees.13 Figures 3.8a and 3.8b compare the 
average performance of small and large establishments in terms of their revenue and "surplus". With 
respect to revenue, the average performance in each group appears to be quite similar. Both ex- 
perienced a trend of "real" growth and their deviations--with the exception of 197617--are also in 
the same direction. However, when we delve further into the "surplus" category, differences begin to 
appear. While the trend for both groups is still upward, their "surpluses" often deviate in opposite 
directions. This is even clearer in Figure 3.9a where annual rates of change in "surplus" are 
plotted: out of 10 observations, 6 are in the opposite directions. Figure 3.9b further illustrates 
these differences. It is divided into 4 quadrants and a 45" line passing through the zero-growth 
origin. The North-West and South-East quadrants contain the "opposite-growth" observations (opposite 
sign) and the North-East and South-West quadrant--the "similar-growth" observations (same sign). The 
45" line represents the "equal growth combinations": the farther an observation is from this line, 
the greater the difference between the rates of change of the two variables. Here we can see that 
l3 As noted before, the size difference between the two categories is substantial. In 196415 the 
average employment figures were 550 for a large 'representative' establishment and 23 for a 
small one. In 198314 the average figures for large establishments reached 856 while for a small 
establishment the average employment level remained at ... 23. Even if one does not accept an 
average as a proper representation for such a wide establishment grouping (5 to 300 employees), 
the size difference between the "300 plus" group and the preceding "100-299" group is still 
substantial enough to justify this dividing line. 
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even in 1968/9, 1969/70, 1980/1 and 1983/4 when average "surpluses" in both groups moved in the same 
direction, the differences in growth rates between the two groups were quite substantial. 
If we are correct in our hypothesis that the "300 plus" establishments are in essence members of 
one coherent group (mostly under the control of the large holding groups), then we should contrast 
the performance of this group as a whole with the aggregate figures for the smaller establishments. 
The difference between this comparison and the examination of 'representatives' is due to the 
possibility of one aggregate group "biting" into the other's business, something that need not be 
reflected in the average establishment figures.14 With respect to aggregate revenue the two groups 
exhibit, again, very similar upward trends. The picture with respect to aggrega.te "surplus" in each 
class is presented in Figures 3.10a, 3.10b and 3.10~. Like the case for the average figures, both 
groups experienced a similar upward trend but very different fluctuation patterns (5 opposite-sign 
observations and most observations are far from the 45" line). 
FIGURE 3.10a 
Aggregate "Surplus": "Small" Versus "Large" Establishment Groups (Thousand 1980 Prices) 
l4 Note that whle aggregating the results of the "300 plus" establishments might be justified on 
the basis of common ownershp, aggregation over small establishments results has no such 
"ownership" basis. Most small establishments are under distinctly separate ownership. 
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3.2.2 Business Sector: the Largest Holding: Groups Versus the "Rest" 
So far we have considered industry only. A comparison between the 'Big Economy' and 'Small 
Economy' of the business sector as a whole is more difficult to conduct. While we have the holding 
groups' profit data to represent the 'Big Economy', no comparable figures for the 'Small Economy' are 
available. However, pretax "capital income" of the 'Small Economy' can be indirectly estimated from 
the National Accounts, by subtracting the pretax profit of the major holding groups from aggregate 
"capital income" of the business sector as a whole.15 The 2 pretax profit series are compared in 
Figures 3.11a and 3.11b. With respect to trend, both the 'Big Economy' and the 'Small Economy' 
experienced real growth until the mid-1970s. After 1975, the 'Small Economy' started to stagnate 
while the holding groups leap forward in terms of their profits. Figures 3.12a and 3.12b describe the 
evolution of growth rates in profit and "capital income" between 1967 and 1986. Out of 18 observa- 
tions, 7 indicate opposite-sign growth rates for the two series, with the disparity becoming more 
pronounced after 1975. 
3.2.3 Conclusions 
The general view emerging in this section is one of substantial differences between the 'Big 
Economy' and the 'Small Economy'. The Industry and Craft Survey data indicate that while small and 
large establishments experience similar trends and fluctuations in their sales revenue, their "sur- 
plus" results are quite distinct and often deviate in opposite directions. The same disparity emerges 
when we compare the holding groups pretax profit to the (imputed) "capital income" obtained in the 
rest of the business sector. The divergence between these profit and "capital income" performances 
intensified since the mid-1970s. 
l5 A better overall category will be "capital income" including (imputed) subsidies on government 
loans. These data are avaiiable, though, only since 1975. The temporal behaviour of this and the 
"capital income" (excluding imputed subsidies) series are very similar so we use the latter 
series which span the entire 1964-86 period. 
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The 6 largest holding groups experienced similar developments and appear to perform as a 
coherent cluster (at least until the early 1980s). Furthermore, their 'ultimate' business results 
(profit or "surplus") move in a quite distinctly different manner than the results experienced by 
other, smaller business units. While the Israeli economy is often characterized by a single 'macro- 
economic' environment, it is clear that this environment reflects two different and often conflicting 
developments. This is concealed by the SIC production perspective where we compare different bran- 
ches, since both the holding groups as well as other businesses operate in the same branches. The 
ownership perspective, on the other hand, indicates a clear dichotomy in business results between the 
'Big Economy' and the 'Small Economy' crossing throughout the economy. 
3.3 Aamegate Concentration and Distribution Measures 
The final step is to examine trends in 'aggregate' concentration: to determine how the absolute 
business results of the 'Big' versus the 'Small' economies are reflected in their relative performan- 
ces in sales, "surplus" and profit, and also how these relative indexes have evolved since the mid- 
1960s. 
3.3.1 Industrv Data 
It is common to indicate the degree of aggregate concentration by a "share" figure, as for 
instance by the share of the 50 largest firms in total sales or profits of the industry or the 
economy. We use a slightly different measure and examine the ratio between the two components of the 
total--those associated with the 'Big Economy' and the 'Small Economy'. This "ratio" measure is more 
sensitive to changes in relative shares16 and it can be more easily decomposed. 
Figure 3.13a describes the evolution of two ratios. The first is the ratio between aggregate 
l6 When we measure the "share" of the 'Big Economy' in the total figures, the 'Big Economy' appears 
twice, in both the numerator and the denominator. The "ratio" figure between the 'Big Economy' 
and 'Small Economy' has each component appearing only once. 
sales made by all "300 plus" establishments and aggregate sales by all other industrial establish- 
ments ("aggregate sales ratio"). The second ratio is that between the aggregate "surplus" of each of 
these establishment groups ("aggregate surplus ratio"). 
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Several developments are evident from this comparison: 
(i) There has been a steady upward trend in both of these 'concentration indexes'. The ratios in 
sales and "surplus" both rose from about 0.4 in the mid-1960s to over 1 in the early 1980s. 
(ii) An important difference between the large and small groups is that the "aggregate surplus ratio" 
between the two size groups usually exceeds the "aggregate sales ratio" between them. This indicates 
that the large establishments are more "profitable", at least to the extent that "surplus" is an 
index for profit (as noted in section 3.1.2, "surplus" also contains cost items, such as interest 
costs, advertisement, depreciation, etc., and the relative distribution of these is unavai~able).~~ 
(iii) While the trend in the "aggregate sales ratio" is rather "smooth", the "aggregate surplus 
ratio" is fairly volatile. The latter ratio is more important for our purpose (since it refers to the 
'end' rather than 'means' of business activity) and we examine its development further below. 
The "aggregate surplus ratio"--the ratio between the aggregate "surplus" of the large and small 
establishments groups--can be written as the product of two other ratios: the ratio between the 
number of large and small establishments (the "establishment number ratio") and the ratio between the 
average "surplus" of large and small establishments (the "average surplus ratio"). The evolution of 
these two ratios given in Figure 3.13b, decomposes the "aggregate surplus ratio" depicted in Figure 
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l7 Sales are composed of 3 elements: wage costs, material costs and "surplus". It turns out (from 
results unreported here) that the "aggregate wage-costs ratio" between large and small es- 
tablishments is also consistently higher than the sales ratio, whle the "aggregate material- 
cost ratio" is consistently lower than the sales ratio. This means that the shares of both 
components of "value added" (wage-cost and "surplustg) in aggregate sales are higher for the 
large establishments group than for the small establishments group. 
According to the "aggregate surplus ratio", concentration followed an upward trend throughout 
the period but much of the rise in concentration took place since the mid-l970s, in particular from 
1977 onward. This was the result (in a technical sense) of two quite distinct developments: (i) a 
decline in the "average surplus ratio" until the mid-1970s and then a rapid rise, and (ii) a strong 
increase in the "establishment number ratio" until the early 1970s, followed by a very slow rise in 
this ratio since then. We discuss both of these below. 
(i) The "average sumlus ratio". From the mid-1960s and until tlie mid-l970s, the average 
"surplus" performance of large establishments (the perfonnance of a large 'representative' establish- 
ment) actually declined relatively to that of small establishments: the "average surplus ratio" 
between large and small establishments was about 40 in 1968 but less than 30 in the mid-1970s. From a 
macroeconomic perspective this was largely a prosperous period but the 'ownership perspective' 
reveals two conflicting developments. In that period, the average "surplus" of small establishments 
rapidly rose, while the average "surplus" of large establishments actually stagnated (see Figure 3.8b 
on p. 42). This situation has reversed since the mid-1970 for with persistent macroeconomic stagna- 
tion, the average "surplus" performance of large establishments grew much faster than that of small 
ones. As a result, the "average surplus ratio" between large and small establishments rose from less 
than 30 in 197516 to over 45 in 198112. Figure 3.8b). 
(ii) The "establishment number ratio". Figure 3.14 plots the number of small establishments (5- 
299 employees) versus the number of large establishments (300 or more employees). With the exception 
of 198011, the number of large establishments grew throughout the 196415-198314 period. The number of 
large establishments started to grow with the economic boom following the 1967 War and the expansion 
of the market (incorporating a population of over one million new consumerslworkers from the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip). The most rapid increases took place in the 3 years between 196718 and 
197011 (from 77 to 128 "300 plus" establishments). In the 15 year period since then, as the 'Big 
Economy' "stabilized", only 36 more establishments were added to the large establishments category. 
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The evolution of the 'Small Economy' in terms of establishment numbers is quite different. 
Unlike the 'Big Economy', there is no apparent growth trend here and the numbers fluctuate throughout 
the period. In the 196718-197011 period of prosperity, when the number of large establishments grew 
by 66%, the number of small establishments actually decreased by 111 (from 5909 to 5798). In 1969170, 
when the GNP grew by almost 13% in real terms, 674, or 9.3%, of all small establishments actually 
disappeared! (The number fell from 6290 to 5616.) The elimination of these establishments cannot be 
attributed to stagnation for the 196718-197011 period saw brisk expansion in the average "surplus" of 
small establishments, both absolutely and relative to large establishments (see Figure 3.8b and 
3.13b). These small establishments probably disappeared due to fierce competition or through mergers 
and acquisitions with the larger establishments.18 The number of small establishments started to grow 
l8 There are no accessibly merger and acquisitions statistics in Israel to validate or refute this 
hypothesis. There are some data regarding registration and winding-up of companies, based on the 
Registrar of Companies' information. These indicate a net increase of companies in the 1969170 
period, when 9.3% of all small establishments disappeared. In 1969, the net increase of in- 
dustrial firms was 531 (606 new industrial firms were registered and 75 were dismantled), while 
again in 197011 and reached its peak in 197213. Since then a mild downward tendency is apparent, with 
similar fluctuations to those seen in the number of large establishments. 
What can these developments in the "aggregate surplus ratio", the "average surplus ratio " and 
the "establishment number ratio" tell us about concentration from an 'ownership perspective'? These 
establishment data are only reflections of the activities of firms: the large holding groups, other 
large firms and the multitude of one-establishment firms of the 'Small Economy'. On these we have 
very little detailed empirical information, so the following conclusions must be taken as tentative 
hypotheses for further research rather than definite inferences. 
Israeli industry apparently went through two different process of concentration. The first 
process, until 1977, involved the relative growth of the 'Big Economy', mainly mergers and 
acquisition of smaller establishments. This was accompanied by a relative decline in the average 
"surplus" performances of the expanding "300 plus" establishments. As a result of these two opposing 
developments, the "aggregate surplus ratio" between the large and small groups remained stable until 
the mid-1970s. The second process started in the late 1970s. After the establishment-structure of 
industry, and most probably, the ownership-structure, had been "fixed", the relative expansion of the 
'Big Economy' was mainly due to the growth in average establishment "surplus". By the mid-1970s, the 
large establishments were already bound under the control of the large holding groups and they 
dominated Israeli industry. This enabled them (i) in a period of persisting stagnation, to ap- 
propriate an increasing share of the civilian-industry aggregate "surplus" when smaller firms, who as 
a group, lost some of their market share, and (ii) to receive an increasing portion of government 
military orders which, since the mid-1970s, have became the most important and profitable activity of 
Israeli industry. 
in 1970 the net addition was 357 (646 firms registered and 287 dismantled) [see CBoS, Statisti- 
cal Abstract of Israel (1972) pp. 237-2381. These data pertain to firms rather than establish- 
ments, and they do not cover subsidiaries, which is of utmost importance for our purpose here 
(since if a small firm was bought by one of the large holding groups this would not be recorded 
as either registration or winding-up of a company). Most importantly, the data of the Registrar 
of Companies are in a very serious disarray and any conclusions based on them must be made with 
extra caution. 
3.3.2 hold in^ G r o u ~ s  in the Business Sector 
In the previous sector we evaluated the development of concentration in industry alone. The 
difficulty in interpreting these results from an 'ownership perspective' (in reference to the holding 
groups) arose mainly because the data pertained to establishments and not firms and, more important- 
ly, because they were limited to industry, while the holding groups embrace the entire economy. In 
this section we consider the holding groups' weight in the business sector as a whole. 
The difficulty here is due to a lack of reliable information regarding performance by the rest 
of the business sector. As noted in Part Tho, business income statistics are not estimated directly 
but imputed by subtracting wage cost from NNP originated by the business sector.lg As a result, our 
imputation of the share of the holding groups in the total figures uses data from two different 
sources: the holding-group data are based on the 'accounting' definitions of the shareholders 
reports, while the total 'Business Sector' figures follow the 'economic' definition of the National 
Accounts. Consequently, the empirical results of this section must be, again, interpreted as general 
indications only. 
Figure 3.15 plots two time series: the pretax profit of the 6 largest holding groups as a share 
of Israel's GNP, and the pretax profits of these groups as a share in aggregate pretax "factor 
income" or" the business sector (including the subsidy component of government loans for domestic 
production).m The two series move together quite closely. Like similar comparisons in the previous 
section (based on the Industry and Craft Survey), these series indicate that with regard to pretax 
income, (i) the holding groups gained much of their significance since the mid-1970s (their pretax 
profit as a share of the GNP was 0.7% in 1970,2% in 1975 and 4.2% in 1980, while with respect to 
l9 The 'Business Sector' figures include the activity of government-owned corporations but excludes 
direct production by government and non-profit institutions. 
2o By definition, aggregate pretax "factor income" equals NNP. Time series data of NNP by the 
'Business Sector' are available since 1960 but a series including the government subsidy 
component in loans for domestic production exists only since 1975. Because this subsidy is a 
substantial component of the "capital income" figure and is also included in holding groups' 
profit calculation, we chose to use the later series. 
aggregate "factor income" of the business sector their share was 2.8% in 1975 and 6.1% in 1980), and 
(ii) since the early 1980s, the weight of the holding groups (in the economy as a whole and the 
business sector in particular) experienced strong fluctuations (their pretax profits as a share in 
aggregate "factor income" of the business sector fell to 2.5% in 1983, rose back to 4.5% in 1985 and 
declined again to 2.5% in 1986). 
FIGURE 3.15 
Holding Groups' Pretax Profit as 
a Share of GNP and as a Share of Pretax "Capital Income" of the Business Sector 
Moving a step further, we examine now the share of the large 6 holding groups not in aggregate 
"factor income" of the business sector, (which includes both labour and capital income) but in 
aggregate "capital income" only. Figure 3.16 presents two series: the share of the largest 6 holding 
groups in aggregate pretax "capital income" and their share in aggregate net "capital income" of the 
business sector. [Aggregate net "capital income" for the business sector is imputed by subtracting 
the total annual tax payments made by corporations and unincorporated business from "capital income" 
of the business sector (including subsidy component in government The picture emerging 
from Figure 3.16 is different than the one presented by Figure 3.15 in several respects. (i) The 
share of the large holding-groups' profit in aggregate "capital income" of the business sector (both 
FIGURE 3.16 
Holding Groups' Pretax Profit 
as a Share of Pretax and Net "Capital Income" of the Business Sector 
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pretax and net) is, obviously, much more substantial than their share in aggregate "factor income" as 
a whole: in the early 1980s, while the holding groups' pretax profit amounted to about 6% of agg- 
regate "factor income", this reached over 20% of aggregate "capital income" of the business sector. 
(ii) Between 1975 and 1980, the share of holding groups' profit in the 3 aggregates (that is, in 
aggregate pretax "factor income", in aggregate pretax "capital income" and in aggregate net "capital 
income") all experienced an upward trend. However, the holding-groups' share in "capital income" grew 
21 Tax data for corporations and unincorporated businesses are annual aggregates of monthly data 
provided to us by the Ministry of Finance. These are actual tax payments which differ from the 
tax obligation figures used in the financial reports to shareholders. 
much more rapidly than their share in aggregate "factor income". In that period, their share in 
aggregate pretax "capital income" rose 2.9 times (from 7.1% to 20.7%) and their share in aggregate 
net "capital income" increased by 4.2 times (from 3.6% to 15.1%). On the other hand, their share in 
aggregate pretax "factor income" rose only by a factor of 2.2 (from 2.8% to 6.1%). (iii) From 1980 to 
1956, the development of each of these three ratios has been different. Since 1980 the holding- 
groups' share in aggregate pretax "factor income" of the business sector started to fluctuate along a 
downward trend; their share in aggregate pretax "capital income" of the business sector was much more 
stable but their share in aggregate net "capital income" actually continued in its pre-1980 upward 
trend, reaching its highest level (28.8%) in 1986. As we 'refine' our concentration measure towards 
the 'ultimate target' of net profit-that is, as we move from the holding-groups' share in aggregate 
pretax "factor income" to their share in pretax "capital income" and finally to their share in net 
"capital incomeu--the trend of concentration is actually reversed to indicate an uninterrupted 
increase in concentration of net profit through the entire 1975-1986 period. 
FIGURE 3.17 
Share of Net "Capital Income" of Business Sector in GNP and 
Share of Holding Groups' Net Profit in Net "Capital Income" of Business Sector 
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This is a striking result, particularly when we examine Figure 3.17. Here we contrast 2 series: 
the share of the holding groups in aggregate net "capital income" on the one hand, and the share of 
this aggregate net "capital income" in the GNP, on the other. We can see that the rise in the 'net 
profit' concentration index came amid a steady downward trend in the share of aggregate net "capital 
income" in the GNP (where this net "capital income" includes the net income of both the holding 
groups as well as all other corporations and unincorporated businesses). While the business sector as 
a whole appropriated a decreasing share of the GNP in the form of net profit, an increasing part of 
these net profits went to the holding groups. It could be, of course, that the net profits of both 
the holding groups and the rest of the business units declined as a share of the GNP only that the 
latter ratio fell more rapidly. However, as Figure 3.18 indicates, that was not the case for since 
1975, the share of holding-groups' net profit in both the aggregate net "capital income" of the 
business sector and in GNP moved on a very similar upward trend. 
FIGURE 3.18 
Share of Holding Groups' Net Profit in 
Net "Capital Income" of the Business Sector and in GNP 
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this essay we argued that the Standard Industrial Classification is a significantly deficient 
basis for the study of industrial concentration in Israel. Since the same large holding groups 
commonly own/control the leading firms in each industrial branch, we proposed to divide the economy 
into two distinct blocs that differ from an ownership perspective: the "Big Economy" represented by 
the holding groups and the "Small Economy" represented by the multitude of all other, largely 
independent, business concerns. The issue we sought to address was the significance of this distinc- 
tion. Several empirical features were examined. 
First, we compared the profit performances of 6 different holding groups (Koor Industries, 
Discount Investment Corporation, Clal (Israel), Bank Leumi, Israel Discount Bank and Bank Hapoalim). 
The data indicated that in the 1964-1982 period the profit time-series of the 3 "industrial" groups 
and 3 "financial" groups moved sufficiently close to each other--both in trend and deviations--that 
they could be considered as members of one coherent cluster of large business concerns. After 1982, 
differences appeared between the profit performances of the "industrial" and "financial" holding 
groups. Whether or not this indicates the emergence of a new structure is atill early to judge, so 
the "coherent-cluster" hypothesis was maintained. 
Next, we compared profit performances of the 6 holding groups, or the "Big Economy", to those 
recorded by the rest of the business sector, or the "Small Economy". This indicated that the two 
blocs, operating in the same macroeconomic context, experienced distinct business results that often 
deviated in opposite directions. Marked differences in profit performances between large and small 
industrial establishments further confirmed the dichotomy between the "Big Economy" and the "Small 
Economy". 
Finally, we examined the evolution of several aggregate concentration measures based on the 
dichotomy between the "Big Economy" and the "Small Economy". The picture emerging was of an upward 
trend in concentration between 1964-1986. This trend became increasingly pronounced as we 'refined' 
the concentration index, moving from indexes based on sales to pretax profit and, finally, to net 
profit. 
The analysis presented in this paper must be interpreted with caution for available data are 
often inaccurate and their degree of inaccuracy is frequently unknown. Nevertheless, the rationale 
for separating the holding groups of the "Big Economy" from the "Small Economy" on the basis of 
ownership/control is strongly supported by marked differences in business results of the two blocs. 
This general conclusion is unlikely to be undermined by data inaccuracies. 
The significance of this conclusion may prove to be far-reaching. As we noted in the first part 
of the essay, the holding groups assumed a central role in the evolution of Israeli economic history. 
If the ex-post performances of these groups are indeed different from--and even opposite to--those of 
the rest of the business sector, the conventional wisdom regarding the Israeli economy, or at least 
several of its important facets, deserve re-examination. 
Certain important issues might require careful scrutiny: How have different economic policies 
affected the two blocs of the business sector? Military spending, tax policy, subsidization, govern- 
ment allocation of credit from foreign and domestic sources, government debt-financing and the 
consequent evolution of the domestic national debt--have probably carried different implications for 
the two business blocs. If this was the case, relevant issues cannot be analyzed in abstraction from 
the underlying ownership structure. Furthermore, how was the evolution of economic policies related 
to changes in the ownership structure and changes in concentration? Finally, how has the evolving 
process of concentration affected macroeconomic and other government policies? How have the inter- 
dependencies between the large holding groups and the Israeli government developed? Have Israeli 
government policies slowly become constrained by an increasingly concentrated ownership structure? 
These questions are still to be addressed. 
Much of the basic material for this essay was collected and collated by the principal authors 
(Nitzan and Bichler) when Nitzan visited Israel in the Autumn of 1987. Travel costs for this visit 
were provided by McGill University. The final report was written in Montreal after Nitzan's return to 
the Department of Economics, McGill University. 
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